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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973: IS THE 
STATUTE ITSELF ENDANGERED? 
David B. Stromberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A congressional commitment to the preservation of wildlife has 
long existed in the United States, as evidenced by such statutes as 
the Lacey Act of 1900,1 the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 
1929,2 and the Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940.3 During the 1960's, 
Congress enacted comprehensive statutes designed to protect en-
dangered species of fish and wildlife, beginning with the Endan-
gered SpeCies Preservation Act of 19664 and followed by the Endan-
gered Species Conservation Act of 1969.5 These later acts, however, 
proved to be largely ineffective because they required federal agen-
cies administering federal projects only to consider the protection of 
endangered species rather than to defer to their absolute preserva-
tion.8 As a result, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 
• A.B. Cornell University 1976. Third year law student, Boston College Law School. J.D. 
expected, May, 1979. 
I 16 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1970) (Protection of Migrating Game and Insectivorous Birds). 
z 16 U.S.C. §§ 715 et seq. (1970). 
I 16 U.S.C. Of 668 et seq. (1970). 
• 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-668cc-6 (1970) as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-135 §12(e) (1969). 
• 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa-668cc-6 (1970) (repealed 1973). 
• The weakness of these earlier statutes can be traced directly to the language of their 
statements of purpose and policy. For example, the 1969 Act declared that congressional 
policy is "to protect species of native fish and wildlife, including migratory birds, that are 
threatened with extinction, and, insofar as is practicable and consistent with the primary 
purposes of such bureaus, agencies, and services." 16 U.S.C. §§ 668aa(b)(1970) (emphasis 
added). Federal departments construed "insofar as practicable" as a congressional intent 
merely to consider the protection of endangered species, rather than a formal and fundamen-
tal requirement of preservation. See 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 50189 (1975). For further discussion of 
earlier federal animal protection legislation, see Comment, Endangered Species Protection: 
A History of Congressional Action, 4 ENv. AFr. 255 (1975); Comment, Vanishing Wildlife and 
Federal Protective Efforts, 1 EcOLOGY L.Q. 520 (1971). 
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19737 (ESA) which mandated the preservation and protection of 
endangered and threatened species. 
This article will explore the nature and framework of the 1973 
statute, focusing on those sections significant to both environmen-
talists and agencies responsible for the construction of federal pro-
jects. Pertinent provisions of ESA and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)8 will be compared to particularize the apparent 
strengths and potential weaknesses of ESA. An examination of the 
manner in which ESA has been interpreted by the courts will follow, 
with special concentration on TVA v. Hill, a case just decided 
by the Supreme Court. Finally, the article will assess ESA's 
relationship to such proposed projects as the Dickey-Lincoln School 
Lakes Dam Project in northern Maine and will suggest statutory 
revisions which may prevent similar conflicts from arising in the 
future. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 
Senator Tunney of California, one of the Act's chief proponents, 
articulated the congressional rationale behind the passage of ESA 
in 1973: 
The rate of extinction (of endangered species) has increased to a point 
where, on the average, one species disappears every year .... To allow 
the extinction of animal species is ecologically, economically, and ethi-
cally unsound. Each species provides a service to its environment; each 
species is a part of an immensely complicated ecological organization, 
the stability of which rests on the health of its components. At present, 
we are unsure of the total contribution of each species of fish and wildlife 
to the health of our ecology. To permit the extinction of any species 
which contributes to the support of this structure without knowledge of 
the cost or benefits of such extinction is to carelessly tamper with the 
health of the structure itself.' 
The House and Senate reports offer stronger evidence of congres-
sional concern for the continued preservation of endangered species: 
[M]any biological, medical, and behavioral sciences value all living 
species as subjects for research and investigation. An uncommon plant 
or animal now considered 'worthless' may tomorrow prove important for 
scientific or medical research or for highly practical uses. . . .[T]he 
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). 
• 119 CONGo REC. 25668 (1973). 
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elimination of one species from a natural community can result in dis-
ruption of the ecological balance necessary to preserve many interre-
lated lifeforms. 1O 
Section 2(b) of ESA responds to these concerns by succinctly 
stating that "the purposes of this Act are to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program 
for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species."11 In addition, section 2(c) of the Act emphasizes the strong 
congressional policy mandating federal cooperation by providing 
that "all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve 
endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their 
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act."12 
The protections afforded by the Endangered Species Act cover 
species and subspecies of all members of the plant and animal king-
doms. "Endangered species" are defined in the Act as "any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant por-
tion of its range;"13 similarly, "threatened species" are defined as 
"any species which is likely to become an endangered species within 
the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range."14 The phrase "throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range" has been interpreted by the Interior Department as sanction-
ing protection of a localized population of the species or subspecies 
even if populations of the same species or subspecies are surviving 
in some other geographical area. 15 
10 S. REP. No. 93-307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973). See generally Hearings on S. 1983 before 
the Senate Subcommittee on the Environment of the Commerce Committee, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 93-67 (1973). 
\I Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (Supp. IV 1974)). 
Section 1531 is distinguishable from its counterpart in the 1969 Act (§ 668aa) in that the 
latter's "insofar as practicable" language has been deleted in the present statute in favor of 
a more substantive commitment to the preservation of endangered and threatened species. 
See note 6, supra. In addition, § 668aa of the 1969 Act referred to endangered species as those 
species of fish and wildlife "threatened with worldwide extinction." However, this term as 
defined in § 668cc-3 clearly is dealing with only endangered species, not with threatened 
species as defined in the 1973 Act. In this respect, the intent of Congress was to expand the 
scope of the coverage of ESA. 
12 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(Supp. IV 1974). 
13 16 U.S.C. § 1532(4)(Supp. IV 1974). The definition of endangered species specifically 
excludes insects determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be pests. 
" 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15)(Supp. IV 1974). For a detailed look at "endangerment" decisions, 
see Ramsay, Priorities in Species Preservation, 5 ENV. AFF. 595 (1976). 
15 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 50190 n. 12 (1975). However, dicta in Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th 
Cir. 1977), cert. granted 46 U.S.L.W. 3322 (1977), implies that such an interpretation by the 
Interior Department may be only persuasive at best. 
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ESA is administered by the Secretaries of the Interior and Com-
merce,18 who are directed to determine which species of plants, fish, 
and wildlife are endangered or threatened according to additional 
statutory criteria.17 ESA requires that the Secretary of the Interior 
compile and publish in the Code of Federal Regulations a list of all 
species receiving these classifications.18 
Section 7 of ESA, the most critical part of the Act, delineates the 
duties of federal agencies in preventing the further decline of pro-
tected species; 
The Secretary [of the Interior or Commerce, whichever is appropri-
ate] shall review other programs administered by him ~nd utilize such 
programs in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. All other Federal 
departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the assis-
tance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation of 
endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 4 
of this Act and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions 
authorized, funded or carried out by them do not jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of such endangered species or threatened species or result 
in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is 
determined by the Secretary, after consultation with the affected 
States, to be critical.·· 
Conservation, as defined in section 4(2), includes "the use of all 
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endan-
.1 Under 16 U .S.C. § 1533(a)(I)(Supp. IV 1974), the Department ofthe Interior is primarily 
responsible for the addition or deletion of species to or from the "endangered" or "threatened" 
species list. The Secretary of Commerce has the full authority pursuant to § 1533(a)(2) to 
protect or remove protection of certain marine species with the concurrence of the Secretary 
of the Interior. Under § 1533(a)(2)(C), the Interior Secretary may not list or remove from the 
li~t any endangered or threatened marine species without a prior favorable determination 
from the Secretary of Commerce . 
• 7 [d. § 1533(a)(I). The criteria for this determination includes the following factors: 
(1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or 
range; 
(2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, scientific, or educational purposes; 
(3) disease or predation; 
(4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or 
(5) other natural or manmade factors . 
• 1 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(i) (1975) . 
• 1 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added). Although § 7's language indicates 
the Act's importance specifically for federal projects, privately-sponsored actions and state 
and local government-sponsored projects are indirectly included as well, since these usually 
require federal permits, licenses, or matching funds. Wood, Section 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973: A Significant Restriction for All Federal Activities, 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 
50189, 50190 (1975). 
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gered species or threatened species to the point at which the mea-
sures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary."20 
The intent of these two sections, along with the mandate that all 
federal departments and agencies utilize their authority in acting to 
conserve such species, is to require all federal agencies to prevent 
the further decline of protected species an<:i to restore them to an 
optimum level of safety. 
Two additional sections of ESA warrant mention because of their 
role in ESA litigation. Section 921 imposes criminal and civil penal-
ties upon persons who "take" an endangered species: "take" is de-
fined to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in such conduct."22 
In addition, section l1(g) allows any person to file a civil suit on his 
or her own behalf in federal district court to enjoin any person or 
agency (including the United States) "alleged to be in violation of 
any provision of this (Act)."23 Together, these sections subject to 
judicial scrutiny actions taken by federal agencies which amount to 
a "taking" of an endangered species. 24 
ITI. SECTION 7: A GUARANTEE OF PROTECTION FOR ENDANGERED 
SPECIES 
ESA imposes upon federal agencies certain duties comparable to 
those imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA),25 in that both statutes require federal agencies to recognize 
and consider environmental concerns before undertaking any major 
federal project.2ft However, NEPA has been viewed as requiring only 
procedural safeguards,27 which, because of their nonspecific nature, 
zo 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (Supp. IV 1974). 
21 Id. § 1538. 
22 Id. § 1532(14). The wording of § 9 makes no mention of threatened species as being 
protected by criminal and civil penalties; however, since a violation of § 7 applies to threat-
ened as well as endangered species, it has been argued that § 9 penalties would be imposed 
on the "taking" of a threatened species as well. In several of the cases litigated on the 
provisions of ESA, plaintiffs have raised claims of violations of both § 7 and § 9. The courts, 
however, have declined to render a decision based on § 9, and have continuously relied on § 
7. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976), and Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 
(6th Cir. 1977). 
22 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (Supp. IV 1974). 
2' See text at note 22, supra. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). NEPA is the principal environmental statute and strengthens 
Congress' ability to oversee agency actions with adverse environmental effects . 
.. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) to 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 1974). 
"l1 Calvert Cliffs Coord. Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n., 449 F.2d 1109 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Nat'l. Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650,656 (10th Cir. 1971); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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are less than fully enforceable. NEPA directs that "it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable 
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national 
policy, "28 to improve plans and programs towards achieving the goal 
of environmental excellence. The compromising language of this 
provision requires merely that environmental protection be one of a 
totality of concerns to be taken into consideration. Thus, before an 
environmental safeguard is required, it (1) must be "practicable", 
and (2) must .outweigh other national considerations, such as in-
creased energy supplies or an improved economy. 
Section 7 of ESA, by contrast, incorporates an inflexible substan-
tive component into its provisions. Federal agencies are required to 
"insure"29 against jeopardizing endangered or threatened species or 
destroying or modifying their critical habitat.30 In addition, the defi-
nition of conservation in section 4(2) does not permit a balancing 
of ESA concerns against other national considerations. Commenta-
tors, therefore, have stated that the standard under ESA "is not the 
familiar [NEPA] test of maximum mitigation [of environmental 
injury], hut a more demanding guarantee of nondegradation."31 
The reason is obvious: whereas certain environmental concerns may 
be able to withstand minor interference without suffering irrepara-
ble damage, the subtlest of interferences will usually result in the 
complete destruction of an endangered or threatened species. 
The federal agency proposing the construction of a project has the 
initial responsibility in its preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) to examine whether and to what extent the project 
will have an effect on listed endangered species or their habitat.32 
Once a determination is made that the project will in fact affect a 
protected species, the agency, under section 7, must then consult 
2lI Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added). 
21 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. IV 1974). 
31 40 Fed. Reg. 17764-75 (1975). Critical habitat is defined in the Regulations to be "the 
entire habitat or any portion thereof, if, and only if, any constituent element is necessary to 
the normal needs or survival of that species." As such, a federal action would not be in 
compliance with § 7, 
[I]f such action might be expected to result in a reduction in the number or distribu-
tion of that species of sufficient magnitude to place the species in further jeopardy, or 
restrict the potential and reasonable expansion or recovery of that species. [Ajpplication 
of the term 'critical habitat' may not be restricted to the habitat necessary for a minimum 
viable population . 
.. W. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 830 (1977). 
12 EIS's are required to be prepared under § 102(c) ofNEPA. Included in the provisions of 
an EIS is a discussion of the proposed project's effect on any endangered species found within 
the construction area. 
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with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, a division of the Depart-
ment of the Interior. If this consultation sustains the agency's initial 
determination, the agency must then prepare a biological study 
which is to be forwarded to the Wildlife Service. The Service will 
then issue its biological opinion, in which it may propose modifica-
tions in the project, such as an alternative .siting, to eliminate the 
impact on the endangered or threatened species. However, the initi-
ating agency need not acquiesce in the Service's opinion; section 7 
merely requires it to consult with the Interior Department. Should 
a difference of opinion arise as to whether or in what manner a given 
federal project should proceed to construction, the ultimate respon-
sibility of decision is vested in the sponsoring federal agency.33 That 
decision, though, is then subject to review by the courts which will 
ascertain whether "the decision was based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment."34 
IV. LITIGATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
Since the passage of ESA in 1973, only four cases have been 
litigated concerning the protection of endangered species. An exam-
ination of these decisions reveals that the federal courts have con-
strued the Act in a variety of ways, from establishing an inflexible 
substantive proscription against harming endangered species, to 
favoring a balancing test of equitable considerations. Unfortun-
ately, this series of decisions has left both environmentalists and 
federal agencies without a comprehensible basis upon which to pre-
dict future judicial interpretations of ESA. Hopefully, the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in TVA v. Hill will eliminate this confusion. 
The initial case involving endangered species, United States v. 
Cappaert,35 arose in Nevada in 1974. The United States brought a 
civil action for a declaration of its rights to the use of so much of 
the waters appurtenant to Devil's Hole, Death Valley Monument, 
"as may be necessary for the needs and purposes of maintaining the 
pool"38 in which the desert pupfish (Cyprinodon diabilis), an endan-
33 See 119 CONGo REc. 14536, 25689-90 (1973) for the legislative history ofthis interpretation 
of § 7's provisions. 
" National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
sub. nom. Boteler V. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976) (quoting Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. V. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). 
35 375 F. Supp. 456 (D. Nev. 1974). 
" [d. at 457. 
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gered species, was found to exist. In addition, the government 
sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction against the 
defendants, owners and manager of a nearby cattle ranch, to pre-
vent them from pumping water into new and already-existing wells 
except for domestic purposes. 
The district court found that through Presidential Proclamation37 
"the unappropriated waters in, on, under and appurtenant to 
Devil's Hole were withdrawn from private appropriation as against 
the United States"38 and reserved for the preservation of the habitat 
of the pupfish. The district court admitted the evidence presented 
that the defendant's pumping of underground water which com-
prised the supply for Devil's Hole resulted in an inordinate decrease 
in the pool's water level, thereby seriously threatening the viability 
of the species. It granted the United States a permanent injunction 
limiting the defendants to pumping water solely for domestic pur-
poses, so that the water level in Devil's Hole would remain sufficient 
for the survival of the pupfish. 
Cappaert is consistent with the expressed congressional policy in 
favor of the absolute protection of endangered species. However, 
language in the opinion suggests that the court to some extent was 
employing its own balancing of considerations. Chief Judge Foley'S 
conclusion that "the public interest lies in the preservation of this 
endangered species"38 and that "the destruction of the Devil's Hole 
pupfish would go clearly against that theme of environmental re-
sponsibility, "40 implies that a different decision might be rendered 
in another case if the public interest in the recognition of private 
economic interests were superior to the protection of an endangered 
species. Moreover, in examining the probable repercussions of deny-
ing the injunction, the court concluded that "there is grave danger 
that the ... pupfish may be destroyed."41 This "grave danger" 
standard implies the use of a balancing test: given the defendants' 
economic injury, a "grave" danger to the pupfish was required to 
justify the denial of the defendants' right to pump the underground 
waters. Thus, the district court appears to have used a balancing 
37 Proclamation No. 2961, 17 Fed. Reg. 691 (1952) . 
.. 375 F. Supp. at 458. 
31 [d. at 461. 
.. [d. 
" [d. at 460 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the court recognized the resulting 
economic injury to the defendants, and provided for the minimization, wherever possible, of 
the injury to the defendants' livestock and agricultural pursuits, and for the continued pump-
ing for domestic purposes. [d. at 462. 
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test standard analogous to that in NEPA. 
Section 7 of ESA was first analyzed in National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Coleman,42 in which a conservation group sought an injunc-
tion against the Secretary of Transportation to prevent the con-
struction of a portion of interstate highway (1-10) which would trav-
erse the habitat of the Mississippi Sandhill ~rane (Grus canadensis 
pulla) , an endangered species whose entire population (approxi-
mately 40) was located within the proposed construction area. De-
spite official requests by the Interior Department for modifications 
of plans to avoid the deleterious effect on the subspecies, federal 
highway officials approved the proposal without alteration.43 The 
conservation group sued in the federal district court to obtain judi-
cial enforcement of the Interior Department's proposed modifica-
tions, alleging that construction of the segment would threaten the 
continued existence of the crane and would result in the destruction 
and modification of its critical habitat in violation of section 7 . 
The district court found that the Secretary of Transportation had 
"adequately considered" the danger to the crane, and that plaintiffs 
had failed to show that his actions were illegal under section 7. In 
dismissing the Interior Department's statements as speculation for 
"merely reflect[ing] opinions of the effect of the highway on the 
Crane without specifying facts upon which they are based, "44 the 
court further noted that "there may be many kinds of actions which 
can be carried out within the 'critical habitat' of a species that 
would not. . . adversely affect that species," and would not, there-
fore, be inconsistent with section 7.45 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,48 asserting 
that the district court, in holding that the Secretary of Transpor-
tation "adequately considered" the effects of the highway on the 
crane, misconstrued the directive of section 7. Section 7, according 
to the court of appeals, "imposes on federal agencies the mandatory 
duty to insure that their actions will not either (i) jeopardize the 
existence of an endangered species, or (ii) destroy or modify critical 
.. 400 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Miss. 1975). 
<3 [d. at 707. 
U [d. at 711 . 
.. [d. at 712 (quoting United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 40 l"ed. Reg. 21499 (1975». 
The district court concluded that the evidence presented clearly showed that the construction 
ofI-I0 fell within this description, 400 F. Supp. at 712 . 
.. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359,373 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
sub. nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Federation, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). 
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habitat of an endangered species."47 The "adequate consideration" 
standard employed by the district court was in direct contravention 
with the specific statutory provision. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the defendants had failed to take the steps necessary 
to guarantee that the highway would not jeopardize the crane or 
modify its habitat. Further construction was enjoined until the 
modifications suggested by the Interior Department were fully im-
plemented. 
The court of appeals in Coleman strictly construed section 7, and 
in doing so, rejected the balancing test of competing considerations 
employed by the district court. The appellate court acknowledged 
that, pursuant to section 7, the federal agency has the ultimate 
responsibility to decide whether or not to proceed with a project, 
despite allegations of statutory violation by the Interior Depart-
ment. However, Judge Simpson noted that the courts can review 
that decision "to ascertain whether 'the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment.' "48 Thus, the Fifth Circuit created a second 
and formidable check on agency compliance with the substantive 
provisions of the statute. The court directed the district court on 
remand to enter an injunction against construction until the Secre-
tary of the Interior determined modifications necessary for the pro-
tection of the threatened crane. 
Environmentalists were unsuccessful in enforcing ESA require-
ments in Sierra Club v. Froehlke. 49 In Froehlke, an environmental 
group and four individual landowners sought to enjoin construction 
of the Meramec Park Lake Dam and any other dams planned in the 
Meramec Basin in Missouri. The project, which would impound a 
23,000 acre reservoir in the Basin, was intended to provide flood 
c<.>ntrol, water supply, and recreational and navigational benefits to 
the area. However, a serious question was raised as to the effect of 
the project on the continued existence of an endangered species, the 
Indiana bat (Myotis sodalis). Pursuant to the Interior Department's 
" 529 F.2d at 371 . 
•• [d. at 372. The scope of judicial review with respect to the rejection or modification of 
federal agency decisions was later expanded by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in Hill v . TVA, 
549 F.2d 1064, 1074 n.21 (6th Cir. 1977), and Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1304-05 
(8th Cir. 1976), which also asserted that the standard to be used was the one espoused in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971): the agency 
decision should be overturned if it was "outside the scope of its authority" and/or if it was 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
.. 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.n. Mo. 1975). 
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recommendation that a moratorium on construction be declared, 
the Army Corps of Engineers conducted a survey on the bat in the 
project area. It conceded that the bat population "could be ad-
versely affected by continued work on the project,"1IO but neverthe-
less decided to proceed with construction. 
Claiming that the Corps' decision was arbitrary and capricious, 51 
plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court, alleging that the 
construction activities and the rising reservoir would flood the bat 
caves, thereby jeopardizng the continued existence of the bat and 
destroying its habitat in violation of section 7. The plaintiffs also 
claimed a section 7 violation in that the defendants effectively ig-
nored the consultation requirement by disregarding the Interior 
Department's warnings concerning the danger to the bats and its 
request for a moratorium on construction. 52 Despite evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiffs expert witness that the project construction 
would jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered spec-
ies,53 the district court concluded that no evidence had been intro-
duced showing that the Corps' present activities were inimical to 
the bats; indeed, the court stated that the Corps had made "all 
possible reasonable good faith efforts"54 to comply with ESA. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, dismissing the 
plaintiffs section 7 arguments by reiterating that the section merely 
required consultation, not acquiescence by the Corps.55 Further, the 
contradictory evidence presented by the plaintiffs expert witness 
and the Corps' survey led the court to conclude that the district 
court could have found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their 
"burden of showing that the action of the Corps had jeopardized or 
would jeopardize the continued existence of the Indiana bat."s8 The 
.. 5 ENVlR. L. REP. 50189, 50194 (1975), citing Plaintiff's Exhibit 16-A, pp. 3,51-2, from the 
District Court brief. The decision to proceed was presumably because relatively little infor-
mation on the species was available from any source, including the Federal Fish and Wildlife 
Service. See 392 F. Supp. at 144 . 
.. 392 F. Supp. at 142. 
50 [d. at 143. Further, the project was alleged to be a violation of § 9 of the Act in that its 
construction was a "clear attempt to harass or harm" the bats by flooding its caves. 534 F.2d 
at 1301-02. 
S3 392 F. Supp. at 144 . 
•• 392 F. Supp. at 138 . 
.. 534 F.2d at 1303. 
51 [d. at 1305. The court also rejected the § 9 allegation, IItati~g that: 
The allegation . . . rests upon the asserted ground that the erection of the dam is a 
'clear attempt to harass or harm' the Indiana bat. We are cited to no portion of the record 
so stating nor do we believe that from a fair reading thereof any such attempt may be 
found. The purposes of the dam's construction have heretofore been discussed in some 
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court rejected the plaintiffs "arbitrary and capricious" contention 
by allowing the agency to employ a balancing process: 
It is clear that the decisions reached by the Corps, in the light of 
conflicting considerations involved, were difficult and onerous, but they 
were far from capricious. There is manifested, on the record, a balanc-
ing, on the one hand, of the benefits expected to be derived from the 
project by way of flood control, water supply and abatement of pollu-
tion, and recreation, among other considerations, against, on the other 
hand, the importance of an unspoiled environment. Nor are we unmind-
ful. . . that portions of the project involving large sums of money have 
now been completed .... We find nothing arbitrary or capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion therein.57 
Several aspects of Froehlke deserve criticism. In ruling for the 
Corps, the district court apparently gave less weight to the testi-
mony of a professor of zoology, who had conducted extensive re-
search on the Indiana bat, than to the Corps' conclusion that "the 
Project would probably have no more than an infinitestimal effect 
upon the Indiana bat population in the Meramec basin."58 However, 
the court noted the professor's statement that the Indiana bat would 
probably become extinct even if the project were not built. 59 While 
the court certainly has discretion to weigh the credibility of the 
conflicting evidence presented, it does not seem to have recognized 
the inherent prejudice of the federal agency contemplating con-
struction of the project. By either party's evidence, some effect on 
the endangered species was stipulated, as was the fact that the 
species was on the verge of extinction anyway. The district court, 
therefore, should have employed the protections afforded by ESA, 
especially in light of the congressional intent that the Act's provi-
sions extend to protect species already on the way to extinction.80 
Of greater significance is the fact that the Eighth Circuit clearly 
allowed the Corps to employ a NEPA-like balancing test, notwith-
standing the undisputed effect of some magnitude on the endan-
gered species.81 The use of this balancing approach is proscribed 
when endangered species are involved, and, in light of ESA's ex-
detail. ... An attempt to harass may not reasonably be found therein. This Act, as any 
other, must have a reasonable construction. 
Id. at 1304. 
57 Id. at 1305. 
58 Id. 
51 Id. See 392 F. Supp. at 144 . 
.. 119 CONGo REc. 30166 (1973). 
" See text at note 49, supra. 
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pressed policy and purpose of insuring the continued existence of 
endangered species, it is "not in accordance with law."82 
The most recent challenge to ESA occurred in Hill u. TVA. 83 The 
Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project, to be constructed near the 
mouth of the Little Tennessee River, was proposed by the TVA and 
approved by Congress in October, 1966. The project, as described 
by the court of appeals, was to be a "multipurpose water resource 
and regional economic development project,"84 in which a 16,000 
acre navigable reservoir would be created. It was designed to 
"stimulate new shoreline industrial development, increase recrea-
tional opportunities and tourism, and augment existing hydro-
electric power generating and flood control capabilities" in an area 
"characterized by underutilization of human resources and outmi-
gration of young people."85 Closure of the dam had been scheduled 
for January, 1977. In 1976, plaintiffs, representing the Audubon 
Council of Tennessee and the Association of Southeastern Biolo-
gists, brought suit in the federal district court, alleging that the 
proposed reservoir would flood and destroy the only known habitat 
of the snail darter fish (Perc ina Imostoma tanasi), in violation of 
section 7 of ESA and seeking a permanent injunction against the 
completion of the dam project. The TVA countered that there was 
clear congressional intent that the project "be completed as 
promptly as possible in the public interest,"87 in an attempt to 
neutralize plaintiff's claim of an ESA violation. 
The district court admitted that "the proponderance of the evi-
dence demonstrates that closure of the Tellico Dam in January, 
1977 and the consequent creation of the Tellico Reservoir will result 
in the adverse modification, if not complete destruction, of the snail 
darter's critical habitat."68 However, the court denied injunctive 
" See note 48, supra . 
• 3 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) . 
.. 549 F.2d 1064, 1067 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3322 (1977) . 
•• Id . 
.. 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). The snail darter was discovered in the Little Tennes-
see River in August, 1973, nearly seven years after congressional approval of the project and 
four months before the enactment of ESA. A search for the species in the rivers throughout 
the Alabama-Tennessee region proved unsuccessful. In November, 1975, the snail darter was 
officially designated an endangered species by the Interior Department, and in April, 1976, 
two months after the suit was filed by the plaintiffs, the section of the Little Tennessee River 
was designated as the "critical habitat" of the snail darter. Id. at 755-56. 
" Id. at 758. See also S. REP. No. 94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976); Hearings on 
Public Works for Water and Power Deueloment Appropriations Bill, 1977 before a Subcomm. 
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 260-62 (1976) . 
.. 419 F. Supp. at 757. 
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relief after employing a balancing approach and weighing the sur-
vival of an endangered species against the completion of a public 
works project more than 80% completed and representing a federal 
investment of almost eighty million dollars.89 
On appeal,70 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, 
recognizing that its responsibility under section l1(g) of ESA was 
to insure the conscientious enforcement of the Act, even if it meant 
halting a project the day before its completion.71 The court noted its 
ability to review and grant permanent injunctive relief in any ESA 
case at any time prior to actual project completion.72 It also rejected 
as inapposite all but one of the NEPA cases cited by the TV A in 
support of its proposition that on-going projects in the advanced 
construction stage should be exempted from statutory compliance.73 
The court of appeals relied on the expression of the congressional 
intent behind NEPA in Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA74 as 
an "accurate reflection of the pervading spirit" of ESA: "Congress 
envisaged on-going agency attempts to minimize environmental 
harm caused by the implementation of agency programs. This could 
encompass not only constant reevaluations of projects already 
begun. . . but also the consideration of the environmental impact 
of all proposed agency action."75 
The Sixth Circuit, in determining the inapplicability of the bal-
ancing approach, distinguished NEPA and ESA on this issue: 
"[A]ny judicial error in a NEPA case is subject to later review and 
remedial reversal before permanent damage is done to the environ-
ment. . . .If we were to err on the side of permissiveness [in ESA 
cases] ... the most eloquent argument would be of little conse-
quence to an extinct species. "78 The court of appeals rejected the 
.1 [d. at 759. 
10 Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). 
71 [d. at 1071. As such, the court dismissed the TVA's argument that the extent of project 
completion should be the determinative standard of judicial review, and that the closure of 
Tellico Dam as the terminal phase of an on-going project should fall outside the category of 
"actions" of departments and agencies to be scrutinized for compliance. "Current project 
status . . . is irrelevant in calculating the social and scientific costs attributable to the 
disappearance of a unique form of life." [d. 
72 [d. 
7. [d. at 1072. See Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972),468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army; 470 F.2d 
289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
74 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). 
75 549 F.2d at 1072 (emphasis added) (quoting 468 F.2d 1164, 1176 (6th Cir. 1972)). 
7. 549 F.2d at 1072. 
1978] ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 525 
TVA's theory that congressional approval of Tellico's appropria-
tions in light of the full disclosure of the project's effect on the snail 
darter constituted legislative acquiescence in the agency's noncom-
pliance with ESA.77 Quoting from an earlier District of Columbia 
Circuit opinion,78 Judge Celebrezze noted that repeal by implication 
is disfavored, especially when "the subsequent legislation is an ap-
propriations measure, and when the prior Act is to continue in its 
general applicability."79 Moreover, House Rule XXI specifically 
provides that "no appropriation shall be reported in any general 
appropriation bill .... Nor shall any provision in any such bill or 
amendment thereto changing existing law be in order. "80 The Sixth 
Circuit construed the Appropriations Committee's reports as 
"advisory opinions"81 lacking the force of law, and decided that "to 
credit them would be tantamount to permitting the legislature to 
invade a province reserved to the courts by Article III of the consti-
tution."82 
Both the Sixth Circuit in Hill and the Eighth Circuit in Froehlke 
purported to apply the standard of review that an agency decision 
should be overturned only if it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."83 The Hill 
court, unlike its counterpart in Froehlke, found an agency's decision 
to complete a project at the expense of an endangered species to be 
in complete derogation of section 7 of ESA and hence "not in ac-
cordance with law." Further, the court posited a more rational in-
terpretation of the section 7 consultation requirement: 
Section [7] conveys a pivotal role to the Secretary of the Interior to 
achieve voluntary compliance with the policy objectives of the Act by 
federal agencies and departments . . . his compliance standards may 
properly influence final judicial review of such actions, particularly 
77 The Appropriations Committees of both houses of Congress continued to recommend 
appropriations for the project from 1975 unti11977, stating in the Senate Committee report 
that "the Committee does not view the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting the completion 
of the Tellico project at its advanced state ... " S. REp. No. 94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 
(1976). For a complete account of the Congressional appropriations for Tellico during this 
period, see Brief for the Petitioner at 8-11, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
7R Committee For Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
" 549 F .2d at 1072-73 . 
.. [d. at 1073 (quoting Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XXI, 2, 94th Congo 
(1975)) . 
.. [d. 
1O2 549 F.2d at 1072. 
R3 See note 48, supra. 
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as to technical matters committed by statute to his special exper-
tise .... We see positive benefit to be gained by impressing his criteria 
with a judicial imprimatur.84 
While agencies are not obligated to defer to the Secretary's position 
and may choose to proceed with a project despite objections from 
the Interior Department, they should do so with the understanding 
that, upon judicial review of their decision, the opinion of the Secre-
tary may receive great deference. 
Most importantly, the Hill court rejected a balancing test of con-
siderations and based its ruling on a strict deference to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. The court acknowledged that "[its] re-
sponsibility under [Section l1(g)] is merely to preserve the status 
quo where endangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing 
the legislative or executive branches sufficient opportunity to grap-
ple with the alternatives,"85 and that "only Congress or the Secre-
tary of the Interior can properly exempt Tellico from compliance 
with the Act."88 Although it expressed sympathy with the TVA's 
analysis of the "equitable factors present"87 and noted the agency's 
reasonable efforts to preserve the snail darter, the Hill court stated 
that, "the welfare of an endangered species may weigh more heavily 
upon the public conscience, as expressed by the final will of Con-
gress, than the writeoff of those millions of dollars already expended 
for Tellico in excess of its present salvagable value."88 Lastly, in 
rejecting the repeal by implication theory, the court stated that, 
"[e]conomic exigencies ... do not grant courts a license to rewrite 
a statute no matter how desirable the purpose or result might be. "89 
The Sixth Circuit exercised its proper judicial role by granting the 
injunction, stating that it shall remain in effect "until Congress, by 
appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance with the 
Act or the snail darter has been deleted from the list of endangered 
species or its critical habitat materially redefined. "90 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in TVA v. Hill. 91 
.. 549 F.2d at 1070 . 
.. Id. at 1071. 
AI Id. at 1074. 
II'IId. 
88Id. 
AI Id. (relying on West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 
522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir. 1975». 
II 549 F. 2d at 1075. 
II 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
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V. FROEHLKE AND HILL: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
The seemingly incongruous judicial analyses in Hill and Froehlke 
illustrates the discrepancies in the circuit courts' view of ESA prior 
to the Supreme Court's decision. On the one hand, the Eighth 
Circuit in Froehlke advocated the adoption of a balancing test to 
determine whether a given federal project should proceed to con-
struction, notwithstanding the deleterious effect on an endangered 
or threatened species. The Sixth Circuit, without specifically re-
futing Froehlke, proferred the position that the proper role of the 
judiciary is to adhere strictly to the inflexible statutory language of 
sections 2(c) and 7 of ESA in order to maintain the status quo with 
respect to protected species. 
The Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Dam Project in northern Maine 
illustrates the problem that pending and proposed projects faced 
until the Froehlke/Hill dispute ultimately was resolved. This $600 
million proposed development, in the planning stage for the past 
decade, is to consist of two dams with associated reservoirs and 
hydroelectric generating facilities designed to "harness the natural 
energy of the upper St. John River for use as a source of electrical 
energy to help to meet the needs of New England consumers."'2 In 
addition, the project will provide both recreational facilities and 
flood control protection for downstream areas and communities 
plagued by severe flooding in recent years.'s However, the Army 
Corps of Engineers has acknowledged that all presently known pop-
ulations of the Furbish lousewart (Pedicularis furbishiae), a species 
of plant scheduled for inclusion this year in the list of endangered 
flora,94 are within the project area. For the present, Dickey-Lincoln 
remains tabled!5 
A. TVA v. Hill: The Supreme Court's Dilemma 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hill, 
'Z Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Dam Project-Draft EIS 1-1 (1977) . 
.. [d . 
• 4 [d. at 2-59 . 
• s It should be noted that Dickey-Lincoln has been stalled for other reasons in addition to 
the lousewart. The EPA determined in its review of the Corps of Engineers' Draft EIS that 
certain serious environmental dangers will arise from the construction of the project. For 
example, the ecosystem of the St. John River will be destroyed, the water quality of the 
impoundment will be poorer, and the wildlife habitat under the impoundment will be totally 
destroyed. See letter from William Adams, Jr. EPA Region I Administrator to Col. John 
Chandler, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Dec. 7, 1977). 
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and has made what will hopefully be the ultimate judicial decision 
on the construction and effect of ESA with respect to future pro-
jects. The case raised basically the same two issues that were pre-
sented before the Sixth Circuit. First, the TVA contended that the 
phrase "actions authorized, funded, or carried out" in section 7 of 
ESA should not extend to the concluding stages of a project such 
as the final closure of adam. 98 Extension of ESA would prohibit 
agencies from putting into use a fully completed project found to 
threaten the existence of a protected species regardless of the 
amount of resources expended on the project and regardless of the 
importance of the project to the public interest.97 To avoid this 
result, the TV A analogized Hill to the NEP A cases supporting the 
balancing test: "at some stage, federal action may be so 'complete' 
that applying the Act could be considered a 'retroactive' application 
not intended by the Congress. "98 
Respondent Hill's answer to this initial argument closely paral-
leled the conclusions reached by the Sixth Circuit. That is, ESA was 
intended by Congress to be applicable to all federal projects, includ-
ing those commenced prior to the passage of the statute in 1973. 
When Congress believes it necessary to exempt on-going projects 
from its legislation, it inserts a grandfather clause providing that the 
statute shall not affect particular projects commenced before a cer-
tain date;99 section 7 contains no such clause and, in light of the 
legislative history and subsequent congressional action, it is clear 
that one was not implied. loo Given Congress' priority in preventing 
the extinction of protected species, it is highly doubtful that Con-
gress intended an "unexpressed exemption" for on-going projects. 
Thus, the TVA's reliance on NEPA jurisprudence is irrelevant to an 
ESA case because ESA incorporates a different standard. 
The respondents also argued before the Supreme Court that evi-
dence shows that even under a balancing analysis, the TVA's posi-
tion is untenable. The TV A spent nearly twice as much in the four 
years after discovery of the endangered species and passage of the 
Act.as it had in the preceding seven years. IOI In addition, excavation 
.. Brief for the Petitioner at 19, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
" [d. at 19-20. 
IS Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323,1331 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, sub. nom. Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transportation, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972) . 
.. Brief for the Respondents at 35, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). Cf. Department 
of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, 82 Stat. 824, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)(1970). 
100 Brief for the Respondents at 23, 35, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
,., [d. at 13. 
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and construction of the interreservoir canal, tree cutting, and 
ground scraping in the reservoir area remain to be completed, not 
just the closure of the spillway gates. 102 Finally, a 1977 study pre-
pared by the Comptroller General concludes that the Tellico im-
poundment project's claimed benefits are unreliable, and'that "the 
public value of a river-based development project (capitalizing upon 
the valley's agricultural, recreational, industrial and tourism poten-
tial) may be several times greater than the ... benefits claimed for 
the impoundment."103 Thus, acceptance of the TVA's argument 
would encourage agencies to resist compliance with the statute by 
spending additional funds towards completion, and subsequently 
arguing that it is economically unreasonable to halt the project. 
Secondly, the TVA maintained that the legislative history of sub-
sequent statutes appropriating funds for Tellico's completion for 
three successive years, with full knowledge of its potential effects on 
the snail darter, manifests a congressional intent not to halt comple-
tion of Tellico in its advanced stage,104 regardless of ESA's mandate. 
That is, since the appropriations for Tellico's completion are incon-
sistent with the provisions of ESA, the doctrine of repeal by implica-
tion should apply. 105 
Respondent Hill countered that, in light of House Rule XXI and 
Senate Rule XVI,106 the differing nature of appropriations acts and 
substantive laws, and the separation of powers between court and 
Congress, the judiciary has declined to permit appropriations acts 
to alter existing law.107 Such acts have been allowed to repeal a 
substantive act of Congress only when (1) the text of the appropria-
tions act itself includes language showing a congressional intent to 
amend the substantive statute; (2) the legislative history is clear 
and unambiguous in expressing the intent to amend the existing 
law; and (3) the two congressional acts are mutually irreconcilia-
ble. los The 1977 appropriations act for Tellico's completion provided 
$2 million for the promotion of the purposes of ESA; hence, the 
,02 [d. at 38. 
,03 [d. at 43. See Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office 
Report No. EMD-77-58, at 21-27 (October 14, 1977). 
'0' Brief for the Petitioner at 21, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
'0' See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974). 
, .. Rule XVI (4), Standing Rules of the Senate, is to similar effect as House Rule XXI. See 
text at note 80, supra. The Senate Rule was not mentioned in the circuit court opinion. 
'07 Brief for the Respondents at 48, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978), See Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346,355 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund 
v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972). 
'0' Brieffor the Respondents at 25, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). 
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Tellico appropriations act is not irreconciliable with ESA and 
should not be construed as a desire to emasculate its provisions or 
purposes. The appropriations act is not entirely inconsistent with 
section 7 because, as the Sixth Circuit wrote, "Con~ess must be 
free to appropriate funds for public works projects with the expecta-
tion that resulting executive action will pass judicial muster."IOB 
Respondents concluded that the appropriate course of action for the 
TVA is to seek an exemption for Tellico from the congressional 
committees with substantive jurisdiction over ESAIIO rather than to 
seek a court decision which would fashion an implied amendment 
from the appropriations committees which have no such congres-
sional jurisdiction in the area. 
In assessing the TVA's arguments before the Supreme Court, it 
appears that a balancing test, while appropriate for NEPA analyses, 
is unwarranted in ESA controversies. The most significant reason 
for this disparity of statutory standards is that environmental con-
cerns improperly subordinated under NEPA may be judicially rem-
ediable; however, once a protected species is interfered with, the 
situation is irreversible, for extinction is absolute. 1I1 The Court, 
therefore, must remain cognizant of the fact that this case presents 
policy issues far broader than whether a 3-inch fish should prevail 
over a 70-foot dam; from a purely economic standpoint, the benefits 
of conserving endangered species can never compare to those bene-
fits derived from public works projects. Moreover, the precarious 
nature of the existence of all endangered or threatened species war-
rants their protection against interference from federal agency pro-
jects at any point during the construction phase if the congressional 
commitment in section 7 is to have any merit. 
Congress has weighed the inherent scientific and aesthetic values 
to be derived from the preservation of endangered species against 
the benefits of public works projects and has enacted a substantive 
statute designed to promote a major federal commitment to the 
former. The Court, therefore, must not disregard the fundamental 
tenet of separation of powers and must permit Congress to be the 
sole legislative body. Congress and the Secretary of the Interior have 
the authority to exempt a project from statutory compliance, and 
the courts, in recognizing the expertise of these parties, must avoid 
,01 549 F.2d at 1073. 
110 Brieffor the Respondents at 58-59, TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1978). See H.R. 4167, 
H.R. 4557, H.R. 5079, H.R. 7392, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
'" See text at note 76, supra. 
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usurping or pre-empting the authority of the executive and legisla-
tive branches. The judiciary must avoid becoming the grantor of 
statutory exemptions on a case-by-case basis. 
C. The Hill Decision and its Ramifications 
The ruling by the Supreme Court affirming the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Hill signified a cogent ratification of the legislative in-
tent in ESA to guarantee unequivocally the continued viability of 
endangered and threatened species against interference from any 
federal public works project, regardless of the extent of completion. 
The balancing test of economic and other considerations should now 
be strictly limited to NEPA cases. The effect of the Court's affirma-
tion should be to compel the TVA in Hill and the Corps of Engineers 
in the Dickey-Lincoln case to undertake a more comprehensive ex-
amination of project altenatives in the preparation of their Environ-
mental Impact Statements, so as to recognize and avoid any nega-
tive impact on protected species and their habitat. The indirect 
result of this ruling should also be to strengthen the consultation 
requirement of section 7 by placing greater emphasis on the Secre-
tary of the Interior's determination of a negative impact and pro-
posed project modifications. 
Nevertheless, even strengthening the statute in its present form 
would not remove entirely the controversy surrounding the consult-
ation requirement. Ultimate responsibility of decision on whether a 
given project should proceed to construction will still rest with the 
sponsoring federal agency, which necessarily would be predisposed 
towards project continuance, rather than with the Secretary of the 
Interior, who remains objectively committed to upholding the intent 
of the Act. The effect of this statutory system is that the Secretary 
or some concerned environmental organization must seek injunctive 
relief in the courts to prevent irreversible damage to protected spec-
ies, an action which necessitates considerable time and money and 
conceivably could be "too little too late." This procedure is incon-
sistent with the policy and purpose of the statute and represents the 
most significant obstacle to absolute preservation of endangered 
species. The situation is easily rectifiable by amending section 7 to 
compel the sponsoring federal agency not only to consult with the 
Secretary of the Interior, but also to acquiesce in whatever is ulti-
mately decided by the Secretary, even if it means scrapping the 
project. Of course, federal agencies would still be provided with the 
alternative of seeking a congressional exemption of the project from 
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compliance with ESA. For example, H.R. 4167112 and H.R. 4557,113 
currently pending in Congress, would specifically exempt Tellico. 
However, the number of the agency/species conflicts requiring judi-
cial intervention would be substantially reduced. If the congres-
sional commitment to the preservation of the species is to have any 
significance, such a statutory amendment is essential. 
Environmental proponents must recognize the significant lobby-
ing power of federal agencies. The affirmation of Hill by the Su-
preme Court might serve as sufficient impetus for those agencies 
collectively to lobby for the repeal of ESA. H.R. 7392114 provides for 
an amendment to section 7 exempting all public works projects 
commenced prior to the date on which notice of the intent to include 
the relevant species in the list of endangered species was published 
in the Federal Register. Although this bill has yet to receive commit-
tee consideration, it is not inconceivable that the Court decision in 
Hill in favor of the respondents may result in the intensification of 
the agencies' lobbying activities for H.R. 7392, or for modification 
of ESA to allow the application of the NEPA balancing test ap-
proach, or even for repeal of the entire statute. Therefore, while the 
Court's decision initially amounts to a victory in the environmen-
talists' battle to protect endangered species, the federal agencies 
may ultimately win the war if their lobbying abilities prove success-
ful. 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court had reversed the Sixth 
Circuit different ramifications would have occurred depending 
upon what rationale was employed by the Court. If the Court had 
determined that the appropriations acts constitute an exemption 
for Tellico, then the snail darter would have been extirpated; how-
ever, ESA wouid have retained its statutory effect for such future 
projects as Dickey-Lincoln, in which the repeal by implication ques-
tion is not at issue. Significantly, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' 
dispute over the propriety of the balancing test would have re-
mained unresolved by this decision. If, instead; the Court had in-
corporated a NEPA balancing test then the endangered species 
and the statute itself would have received their death knell. Under 
such a balancing test, a 3-inch fish could never compete with a $90 
112 H.R. 4167, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
113 H.R. 4557, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
"' H.R. 7392, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill is sponsored by Representative Beard 
of Tennessee and has been referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries with 
subject matter jurisdiction over ESA. 
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million dam project, an "unattractive and useless" Furbish louse-
wart plant could not hope to survive against a $600 million project. 
Indeed, no protected species could ever expect to prevail against 
such national concerns as greater energy production or an improved 
national economy. In short, a Supreme Court decision adopting the 
NEPA approach in ESA cases would have resulted in the elimina-
tion of virtually every endangered or threatened species which 
comes into conflict with a federal public works project. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 represents a congressional 
commitment to the preservation and recovery of endangered and 
threatened species. The statute imposes a significant restraint on 
federal activity by requiring federal agencies to insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by them does not jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the protected species or result in the 
destruction or modification of their critical habitat. Prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Hill, however, the courts had been 
unable to reach any consensus as to whether the statute creates an 
absolute proscription against interfering with protected species, or 
whether the preservation of such species is but one equitable consid-
eration to be balanced against other national concerns. The absolute 
proscription requirement, proferred by the Sixth Circuit in Hill, and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, is warranted in ESA controversies 
where interference with the species invariably results in their abso-
lute elimination. The Supreme Court's decisiqn in Hill has served 
for the time being to preserve the congressional policy of preserva-
tion and conservation. However, while efforts to rep~al and weaken 
ESA go unanswered the Endangered Species Act of 1973 will, itself, 
be endangered. 
